BACKGROUND: Accountable care organizations (ACOs) can improve prostate cancer care by decreasing treatment variations (ie, avoidance of treatment in low-value settings). Herein, the authors performed a study to understand the effect of Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs on prostate cancer care. METHODS: Using a 20% Medicare sample, the authors identified men with newly diagnosed prostate cancer from 2010 through 2013. Rates of treatment, potential overtreatment (ie, treatment in men with a 75% chance of 10-year mortality from competing risks), and Medicare payments were measured using regression models. The impact of ACO participation was assessed using difference-in-differences analyses. RESULTS: [P 5.11]) for non-ACOaligned beneficiaries. These changes resulted in a significant relative decrease in overtreatment of 17% for ACO-aligned beneficiaries (difference-in-differences, 10.8%; P 5.031). Payments were not found to be differentially affected by ACO alignment. CONCLUSIONS: The treatment of prostate cancer and annual payments decreased significantly between 2010 and 2013, but ACO participation did not appear to impact these trends. Among men least likely to benefit, Medicare Shared Savings Program ACO alignment was associated with a significant decline in prostate cancer treatment.
INTRODUCTION
Prostate cancer is the most common cancer diagnosed among men in the United States, with an estimated 180,890 incident cases in 2016, 1 and is among the most expensive to treat, accounting for >$12 billion in annual spending; this figure is expected to increase by 40% over this decade. 2 However, prostate cancer also is one of the most challenging malignancies to manage. The indolent nature of many prostate cancers means that, even without treatment, the majority of men do not die of the disease. As a result, aggressive intervention offers only minimal benefit for many men with early-stage cancer or men with competing risks of mortality due to noncancer health issues, yet exposes them to the side effects of treatment and leads to wasteful spending. This concern for overtreatment led clinical leaders to call for the increased use of observation in lieu of more aggressive initial treatment, particularly among patients in whom tumor biology and competing risks from existing health issues limit the benefits of treatment. [3] [4] [5] [6] Although decreases in screening have resulted in fewer incident cases, 7 rates of treatment among newly diagnosed men have been slower to decrease. 3, 6, 8, 9 Policy that promotes health care efficiency may be positioned to affect changes in prostate cancer treatment, particularly the reduction of overtreatment, by leveraging financial incentives to decrease low-value care. Medicare Shared Savings Program accountable care organizations (ACOs) are one such program. The aim of the program is to increase the value of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries by improving quality and reducing spending. 10 Medicare payments to ACOs incorporate financial incentives for their performance on specified spending and quality metrics for their attributed beneficiaries. Overtreatment in prostate cancer is emblematic of low-quality care and leads to wasteful spending, thereby making it a potential focus of ACOs. Early analyses of the Shared Savings ACOs revealed reductions in wasteful spending by limiting postacute care expenses 11 and reducing readmissions from skilled nursing facilities. 12 The results of these efforts led to modest spending reductions that were entirely offset by the bonus payments in the first full year of the Shared Savings ACOs 13 ; however, by 2014, the spending reductions exceeded bonus payments, leading to a savings of $287 million for Medicare.
14 The question of whether Shared Savings ACOs can translate this improved quality and cost savings into prostate cancer care remains unclear. Prostate cancer is managed largely by specialists who have low ACO involvement 15 and whose financial incentives may not align with those of the ACO. However, because ACOs are responsible for all spending for their assigned beneficiaries regardless of where services are provided, primary care physicians may influence the ultimate treatment decision by preferentially referring patients to specialists whose practice is more aligned with the ACO objectives.
To better understand the effect of Medicare Shared Savings ACOs on prostate cancer care, we performed a study examining rates of treatment, potential overtreatment, and spending among men with newly diagnosed prostate cancer before and after the implementation of ACOs. Understanding whether ACO participation can reduce waste by limiting overtreatment through the more appropriate selection of which patients receive treatment will provide valuable insight into whether the benefits of ACOs are restricted to specified quality targets or whether there is spillover to conditions in which physician discretion plays a large role in treatment, such as prostate cancer.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Data Sources
Using a 20% sample of national Medicare data, we performed a retrospective cohort study evaluating prostate cancer treatment and spending among men with newly diagnosed prostate cancer between 2010 and 2013. The current study included fee-for-service beneficiaries aged 66 years who were eligible for both Medicare Parts A and B for the 12-month period before their diagnosis through December 31, 2014, or death. We also excluded patients enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans because they are ineligible to be assigned to ACOs. 16 We used an established algorithm to identify incident prostate cancer cases in national Medicare claims. 9 The algorithm had a specificity of 99.8%, a sensitivity of 65.9%, and a positive predictive value of 88.7%. We assigned all men with prostate cancer in the current study cohort to primary care physicians using a methodology similar to the Medicare Shared Savings Program final rule. 17 Briefly, providers were identified as primary care physicians using Medicare specialty codes of 01 (general practice), 08 (family practice), 11 (internal medicine), and 38 (geriatric medicine) within the carrier file. We then assigned each beneficiary to a primary care physician based on the plurality of evaluation and management Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) primary care codes and services dating back 2 years from the date of the prostate cancer diagnosis. We required that primary care physicians saw patients before and after ACO implementation to be included in our analysis. In cases of equal numbers of evaluation and management codes for 2 providers, we assigned a beneficiary to the provider receiving the highest payments. We chose to use a look-back period of 2 years from the date of prostate cancer diagnosis, as opposed to the 1-year period used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, because some patients were not evaluated by a primary care physician within the preceding year. This improved our attribution of beneficiaries to primary care physicians from 83% to 87%. Patients who could not be attributed to a primary care physician were excluded from the current study. To determine whether primary care physicians were aligned with Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs, we used the provider-level research identifiable file provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. We considered beneficiaries attributed to these ACO primary care physicians to be ACO aligned.
Outcomes
The current study had 3 outcomes that aimed to assess the effect of Shared Savings ACO affiliation prostate cancer care: 1) overall treatment; 2) treatment among men unlikely to benefit (ie, overtreatment); and 3) annual prostate cancer-related spending. Men were considered to have undergone primary treatment if they received external beam radiotherapy, surgery, brachytherapy, or cryotherapy within 1 year of diagnosis. To identify men least likely to benefit from treatment, we stratified beneficiaries by risk of noncancer mortality using a previously developed mortality model. 9, 18 Briefly, we modeled the probability of death within 10 years using logistic regression, with age, comorbidities, socioeconomic class, degree of environmental development (ie, rural vs urban), and region as covariates. The model had high discrimination Original Article (c index, 0.82). Men with a predicted 10-year noncancer mortality risk of >75% (highest quartile) were considered to be least likely to benefit. It is widely believed that these men receive little to no benefit from treatment given their high likelihood of noncancer mortality and the morbidity associated with prostate cancer treatment. 5, 19, 20 To determine prostate cancer spending, we calculated inflationadjusted, annual per-beneficiary price-standardized prostate cancer-related payments for all diagnosed men and for men in the highest mortality quartile.
Statistical Analysis
We assessed differences in patient characteristics among ACO-aligned and non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries before and after ACO implementation using chi-square tests. Comorbidity was measured using the Klabunde modification of the Charlson Comorbidity Score 21 and socioeconomic class was determined at the zip code level as previously reported.
22
To assess the effect of ACO alignment on our outcomes, we performed a difference-in-differences analysis. 23 This method was used to account for confounding by contemporaneous changes in the screening, diagnosis, and treatment of prostate cancer while quantifying secular trends (ie, trends among non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries not affected by the policy) and identifying the differential effect of ACO alignment. 3, 4, 7 To do this, we first defined whether a primary care physician was affiliated or not affiliated with an ACO. We then specified a time variable that reflected the periods before and after Shared Savings ACO implementation. Because ACO enrollment occurred at 3 distinct time points during our study period (24) 376 (25) 3756 (23) 2892 (23) 2 321 (11) 149 (10) 1679 (11) 1310 (10) 3 287 (9) 150 (10) 1396 (9) 1213 (10 ACO-aligned primary care physicians were included in the postimplementation time period based on the specific date of enrollment of the ACO. Non-ACO-aligned primary care physicians were included in the postimplementation time period on January 1, 2013, because the majority of ACOs in the current study enrolled on this date. We used logistic regression models to calculate treatment rates and negative binomial regression models for spending among a primary care physician's panel of patients. The models adjusted for patient covariates and clustering within primary care providers. Models for each outcome also included an interaction term between primary care physician ACO participation and time period. This interaction term allowed the predicted outcome to differ between beneficiaries cared for by ACO-aligned and those cared for by non-ACO-aligned primary care providers in both the preimplementation and postimplementation periods. The difference-in-differences of the predicted outcomes is the effect of ACO alignment, controlling for secular trends. [24] [25] [26] We confirmed that trends in treatment and spending were similar among all beneficiaries before ACO implementation.
To test the hypothesis that primary care physicians may influence prostate cancer treatment patterns through changes in referral patterns, we stratified urologists caring for 5 patients in our overall cohort and stratified them into tertiles by their rate of initial treatment. This group included 2810 urologists (40%). We then calculated the mean referral tertile for ACO-aligned and non-ACOaligned primary care physicians before and after ACO implementation. We attempted to perform the above analyses within our subgroup of patients least likely to benefit from initial treatment. Because men with a >75% chance of 10-year noncancer mortality represented only 10% of our overall sample, <1% of urologists treated 5 of these patients, meaning that the sample size of this subgroup was not adequate to formally test the hypothesis.
All analyses were performed using in SAS statistical software (version 9.4; SAS Institute Inc, Cary, North Carolina) and STATA statistical software (version 14; StataCorp LLC, College Station, Texas). All tests were 2-tailed and the probability of a type 1 error was set at 0.05. The study protocol was judged to be exempt by the institutional review board of the University of Michigan.
RESULTS
We identified 33,011 men with newly diagnosed prostate cancer, 5065 of whom (15%) were assigned to an ACO. Among ACO-aligned beneficiaries, we noted statistically significant differences in the residential area, with more men living in larger metropolitan counties (52% vs 55%; P 5 .03), and treatment type, with increases in the use of external beam radiotherapy (36% vs 38%) and watchful waiting/active surveillance (19% vs 21%) increasing from before to after the implementation period (P 5 .002) ( Table 1) . Among non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries, we noted differences with regard to age, race/ethnicity, Charlson Comorbidity Score, socioeconomic class, residential area, and treatment type (P<.05 for all). However, Figure 1 . (Top) Overall rate of initial treatment and (Bottom) treatment in men with the highest 10-year noncancer mortality before and after implementation of Medicare Shared Savings Program accountable care organizations (ACOs) stratified by ACO participation. Initial treatment decreased significantly from before to after ACO implementation, but ACOs were found to have no differential effect on this. Changes in treatment among men with the highest 10-year noncancer mortality were not statistically significant over time in either the ACO-aligned or non-ACO-aligned groups; however, the difference-in-differences analysis between these 2 groups demonstrated a significant reduction in treatment of 10.8%.
in both the ACO-aligned and non-ACO-aligned groups, these differences were small and were unlikely to be of clinical significance. Throughout the study period, ACOaligned and non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries were found to be similar with regard to age, race/ethnicity, comorbidity, risk of noncancer mortality, and treatment type, but differed with regard to socioeconomic class and residential area (more ACO-aligned beneficiaries were of high socioeconomic class and resided in larger metropolitan counties).
Adjusted treatment rates are illustrated in Figure 1 and shown in Table 2 . Before ACO implementation, the overall treatment rate for the ACO-aligned beneficiaries was 71.8% (95% confidence interval [95% CI], 70.2%-73.3%). This rate did not differ significantly from the rate in non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries of 72.3% (95% CI, 71.7%-73.0% [P 5 .51]). After implementation, treatment decreased in both groups to 68.4% (95% CI, 66.1%-70.7% [P 5 .017]) for ACO-aligned and 69.3% (95% CI, 68.5%-70.1% [P<.001]) for non-ACOaligned beneficiaries. The 4.2% relative decrease noted among non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries is representative of the ACO-independent trends in treatment. ACO participation was found to have no significant effect beyond this trend on overall treatment (difference-in-differences, 0.31%; P 5 .83).
Rates of treatment in men with the highest noncancer mortality risk (ie, those least likely to benefit) changed over time and differentially with ACO alignment. In the preimplementation period, the rate was 48.2% (95% CI, 43.1%-53.3%) for ACO-aligned beneficiaries and 44.3% (95% CI, 42.1%-46.5%) for non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries, which was a nonsignificant difference (P 5 .16). After implementation, this rate decreased among ACO beneficiaries to 40.2% (95% CI, 32.4%-48.0%) and increased among the non-ACOaligned beneficiaries to 47.0% (95% CI, 44.5%-49.5%), but neither change was statistically significant (P 5 .087 and P 5 .11, respectively). However, these changes resulted in a significant relative difference of 17% in the postimplementation period between the ACO-aligned and non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries (difference-in-differences, 10.8%; P 5 .031) (Fig. 1 Bottom) .
Rates of initial treatment among patients treated by urologists caring for 5 men varied from 48.9% in the lowest tertile to 73.9% in the middle tertile and 91.8% in the highest tertile. There were no statistically significant changes in referral patterns noted over time (Table 3) . Annual prostate cancer-related payments were comparable between ACO-aligned ($15,311; 95% CI, $14,865-$15,756) and non-ACO-aligned ($15,386; 95% CI, $15,197-$15,575 [P 5 .76]) beneficiaries in the period before implementation (Fig. 2) (Table 2 ). There was a significant relative decrease of 4.2% ($648; P<.001) in payments among the non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries whereas payments among ACO-aligned beneficiaries remained relatively stable (decrease of $178; P 5 .65) after implementation. Despite this, the difference in payments between the ACO-aligned and non-ACO-aligned groups was not statistically significant (difference-in-differences, $470; P 5 .26). Prostate cancer-related payments among men with the highest mortality risk increased over time for both ACO-aligned ($1115; P 5 .47) and non-ACO-aligned ($841; P 5 .091) beneficiaries. Again, the difference between the 2 groups was not statistically significant (difference-in-differences, $275; P 5 .87).
DISCUSSION
The rate of treatment in men with newly diagnosed prostate cancer decreased significantly during our study period, irrespective of ACO participation. Shared Savings ACO alignment was associated with a 17% decrease in the rate of prostate cancer treatment among patients least likely to benefit from initial intervention. Annual prostate cancer-related payments declined over the study period, but ACO alignment appeared to have no differential effect on this.
The results of the current study suggest that Shared Savings ACOs initially may improve value in prostate cancer treatment by reducing waste through more careful patient selection. As indicated by the similar overall rates of treatment, ACOs do not withhold treatment but rather focus on improving the case mix of men treated by reducing overtreatment. This may be accomplished by leveraging specialists to improve quality by preferentially referring patients to providers whose treatment patterns align with the goals of the ACO (ie, those specialists who focus on reducing overtreatment and thus improving quality and reducing wasteful spending). Because the analysis herein represents the early period after ACO implementation, the sample size for the subgroup of men least likely to benefit from initial treatment was not large enough to formally test this hypothesis; however, this finding is supported by other analyses of Shared Savings ACOs that found early improvement or unchanged performance on quality measures with cost savings observed only after the first year of ACO participation. 13, 14 This initial focus on quality aligns with previous reports demonstrating that ACO-affiliated practices were more likely to participate in quality improvement collaboratives. 27 In addition, health system interventions have been effective in improving prostate cancer care in previous studies that demonstrated that Pioneer ACOs were able to decrease the use of low-value services, such as the use of prostatespecific antigen testing in men aged >75 years, 28 and that integrated health systems were associated with increased adherence to prostate cancer quality measures. 29 Figure 2. Annual per-beneficiary prostate cancer-related payments (Top) in the overall population and (Bottom) in men with the highest 10-year noncancer mortality before and after implementation of Medicare Shared Savings Program accountable care organizations (ACOs) stratified by ACO participation. Medicare payments changed over the course of the study for both ACO-aligned and non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries. However, the difference-in-differences between these 2 groups were not statistically significant.
The results of the current study should be considered within the context of several limitations. First, because ACO participation is voluntary, primary care physicians who became ACO affiliated may have differed from those who did not with regard to their management of prostate cancer or patient mix. For this reason, the finding of a difference in the rate of treatment among men least likely to benefit within the ACO group may, in part, be explained by a regression to the mean effect. However, in the period before ACO implementation, there were no statistically significant differences in overall treatment rate, potential overtreatment, or prostate cancer-related spending observed between patients cared for by physicians who would become ACO aligned versus those who would not, thereby making regression to the mean effects less likely. Second, because the current analysis represents the early time period after ACO implementation, the sample size was not adequate to formally test whether changes in primary care physician referral practices are the underlying mechanism responsible for our findings. We anticipate that this will become possible as the Shared Savings ACO program continues to expand. Third, the current study data lack information regarding cancer severity, which is a clear driver of treatment. However, we analyzed our outcomes at a population level, and found no biological reason for cancer severity to vary across large populations (ie, ACO-aligned and non-ACO-aligned beneficiaries). 30 Despite these limitations, the findings of the current study have significant implications. For policymakers, improved quality of prostate cancer care, as evidenced by the decreased rate of overtreatment, among patients aligned with Shared Savings ACOs is indicative of a commitment to improve the overall quality of care provided and therefore should be regarded as a policy success. In addition, it is important to note that these quality improvements can be achieved relatively shortly after ACO inception, although cost savings may take longer to realize. This may be due in part to the financial implications of the one-sided risk structure of the majority of Shared Savings ACOs. 31 Because ACOs are not at risk for penalties, the incentive to decrease costs may be diminished and hospitals initially may focus on quality improvement initiatives. This approach could yield maximal financial gains by capitalizing on both fee-for-service payments and partaking in Shared Savings by meeting the quality targets. For ACO leadership, identifying overdiagnosis and overtreatment in prostate cancer can serve as both an opportunity to improve care and reduce costs. In the current analysis, the mean annual per-beneficiary payments were substantially higher than that of the average Medicare beneficiary. 13 Therefore, efforts to limit overdiagnosis should be associated with significant cost savings.
The findings of the current study also have important implications for specialists treating patients with prostate cancer. With the end of Medicare's Sustainable Growth Rate formula and the introduction of the Quality Payment Program as part of the Medicare Access and CHIP (Children's Health Insurance Program) Reauthorization Act of 2015, physicians will be required to participate in either the Advanced Alternative Payment Models or the Merit-Based Incentive Payments System track. 32 Understanding how ACOs can affect prostate cancer care will be paramount as specialists decide which track will be most advantageous. Evidence of early gains in quality by the Shared Savings ACOs may increase specialist participation and, possibly, there may be additional increases in value for prostate cancer care.
Conclusions
The rate of prostate cancer treatment and annual payments decreased significantly between 2010 and 2013. However, ACO participation did not appear to impact these trends. For men diagnosed with prostate cancer, alignment with Shared Savings ACOs was found to be associated with a significant decrease in treatment among those least likely to benefit. This reduction in waste by limiting overtreatment is consistent with improved quality without increasing spending and is an indicator of how early ACO participation can increase value in prostate cancer care.
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